A decade-long compounder is being priced as if the marks on its evergreen book are about to break.

• The de-rating. Stock fell 37% on the 10 Mar 2026 FY25 print despite revenue +20%, EBITDA +19%, profit +12% and a 17th consecutive dividend raise. The trailing P/E collapsed from ~28× to 17.7× — the cheapest end of its 15-year range and below the EQT/Carlyle band.
• What the bears are pricing. On 29 Apr 2026 Grizzly Research published a 100-page short report alleging ~40% of evergreen-fund positions are mismarked, naming six holdings with explicit markup math (Forterro at 27× EBITDA, Unit4 at 22.6× on 3.6% growth, a Swedish data centre marked +177% while revenue fell 18%).
• What the bulls keep on the table. The 1.18–1.33% management-fee margin has held for ten years across COVID, the 2021 mega-cycle and the 2022–24 drought; founders net-bought CHF 33.7M into the crash at a 12:1 buy/sell ratio; PwC delivered an unqualified audit on 10 Mar after KPMG's scheduled rotation.

A 124-bps toll on USD 185B of sticky capital — the line that has not bent through any regime.

Bespoke mandates and evergreens are wired into clients' fund-admin, reporting and capital-call plumbing — switching is operationally painful, so the fee margin has stayed in a tight band even when LPs squeezed peers. Management fees grew every year FY15–FY25 including the COVID revenue-decline year. The next decade requires that combination to keep holding as the wealth-channel partnerships scale.

FY25 was a record print — and the cash beat earnings for the first time in six years.

Performance fees jumped 60% to CHF 819M (32% of revenue vs a 10-year median ~24%), so the headline is cycle-fattened — through-cycle EPS at a 25% perf-fee mix sits closer to CHF 42–44 than the reported CHF 48.45. The under-discussed inflection is the cash side: DSO compressed from 197 to 162 days, and FCF margin hit 58.8% — a six-year high that cuts against the bear's debt-funded-payout framing.

Six months turned a quality-vs-multiple debate into a credibility debate.

• 10 Mar 2026 — Guide reset. FY25 results landed with a 3% H2 EPS miss and FY26 perf-fee guide to the lower end of 25–40%. The 37% one-day move was the largest since the 2006 IPO and re-rated the multiple from ~22× to ~17×.
• 30 Mar 2026 — Succession leak. Co-founder Wietlisbach told Bloomberg CEO David Layton will exit in 2–3 years with no external search disclosed — overlapping the wealth-channel scale-up and AuM-to-USD-450B execution window.
• 29 Apr 2026 — Short report. Grizzly's evergreen-marks thesis converted the multiple debate into a trust debate. PGHN rebutted scope and named three Q4-25/Q1-26 exits above mark (Apex Logistics, STADA, atNorth) but did not answer the position-by-position math on the six allegations.

Three dated events between late May and early September compress the range.

• Late May / early Jun — Master Fund N-CSR. The US Master Fund's FY-March-2026 SEC filing arrives with PwC's first audit opinion since the KPMG rotation. An unqualified opinion with no fair-value emphasis paragraph is the highest-quality third-party read on the Grizzly thesis available before September.
• 15 Jul 2026 — H1 AuM print. First management-controlled disclosure post-Grizzly. The market reads three things in one release: gross new client demand vs the USD 26–32B FY26 guide, Master Fund net flows after Q3-25's USD 750M redemption request, and any commentary on the three contested exits.
• 1 Sep 2026 — H1 interim. First full income statement under IFRS 18 plus restated FY25 comparatives. The single highest-leverage signal is constant-currency management-fee growth: above 10% validates the annuity through the wealth-channel build; below 7% for a second consecutive half would be consistent with a structural bend.