People

The People

Governance grade: B. The three founders still hold ~15% of the equity 30 years in, the comp framework actually penalises bad years (LTI pool was cut 4% in 2025), and there are no golden parachutes or outstanding loans — but the founders also wield veto power over every investment decision and quietly extracted CHF 15.3 million of waived management/performance fees in 2025 alongside their listed compensation, which is the real alignment story.

1. The People Running This Company

Four executives — the Executive Chairman and the three 1996 co-founders — sit on the Board alongside four independents. The CEO (David Layton) is American, runs the firm from Denver, and is the only Executive Team member with truly significant equity at risk; the rest of the ExTeam owns trivial amounts. The founders are the gravitational centre.

No Results

Trust the capability, watch the concentration. Layton was promoted from Head of Private Equity — a deal guy, not a generalist CEO from outside — and the founders coached him for years before handing him the title. That continuity is a strength. The risk is that strategy is still effectively set by four men who have been in the room together since 1996, and the independents (all added 2022 or later) are recent additions stress-testing decades-old habits. Succession is functional at the CEO seat but unproven for the founder seats, where Gantner, Erni and Wietlisbach are all 56–64 and central to investment oversight.

One genuine governance upgrade: Dr. Urban Angehrn (ex-FINMA CEO, ex-Zurich CIO) joining in May 2025 brings real regulatory teeth onto the Risk & Audit Committee, just as the Grizzly Research short report (Oct/Nov 2025) attacked Partners Group's evergreen-fund NAV marks. The timing is helpful for credibility.

2. What They Get Paid

Total awarded pay for the 10-person Executive Team was CHF 67.4 million in 2025 (down from CHF 69.7M in 2024); the eight-person Board was awarded CHF 13.6 million before related-party benefits, and CHF 28.95 million including waived ECP fees. CEO David Layton received CHF 15.93 million awarded and CHF 10.01 million realized.

CEO Awarded 2025 (CHF '000)

15,930

CEO Realized 2025 (CHF '000)

10,014

ExMCP share of award

86%
Loading...
Loading...

Pay is sensible — with one caveat. Layton's CHF 1.66M cash base + deferred is below the median of US listed alternative managers (Blackstone, KKR, Apollo, Ares CEOs all clear USD 10M+ in base+bonus). The reason awarded total rises to CHF 15.9M is the ExMCP performance-fee LTI: it is capped at 1.20x grant, payouts only flow if portfolios clear pre-agreed return hurdles, and the firm explicitly funds it from the unallocated portion of the 40% carry pool — so the framework claim of "no additional cost to shareholders" is defensible if you accept that the 40% pool was always at risk of being allocated elsewhere in the firm. Realized 2025 of CHF 10.0M is what actually moved between accounts; the ExMCP grant is a vintage call option on 2025 deals that will or will not pay in the early 2030s.

The LTI pool was cut 4% in 2025 because the quantitative component (Mgmt Fee EBITDA growth) came in below target at 0.69x. That is pay-for-performance actually working, and a tangible response to the rougher fundraising environment.

No Results

Sarah Brewer and Andreas Knecht stepped down from the ExTeam on 1 January 2026 but remain in senior roles; Ana Campos (HR) and Anette Waygood (Co-Head Compliance & Legal) joined. The firm has committed to a three-year freeze on total base compensation alongside the new ExMCP carry program.

3. Are They Aligned?

This is where Partners Group is genuinely different from public-markets asset managers and genuinely complicated.

No Results

Board insiders own (% of equity)

16.5%

Founders' holding period (years)

30

Skin-in-the-game (1-10)

9

Ownership and control. The three founders collectively own about 15% (4.04 million shares of 26.7 million) — and with Executive Chairman Meister's stake the four-person executive Board controls roughly 16.5% of the equity. Per the latest CGR they have held substantially the same positions through 2025 (Erni +1,930 shares; Gantner +1,930; Wietlisbach +1,930). There has been essentially zero net insider selling in 2025. Combined with the fact that Partners Group has not diluted its share capital once since the 2006 IPO (LTI is settled from treasury), this is best-in-class alignment for a listed asset manager.

Capital allocation. The firm runs a deliberately lean balance sheet — bonds are CHF 1.33B outstanding (June 2019, Sep 2023, June 2024 issuances) and management invests treasury into a buyback-style accumulation rather than aggressive expansion. Treasury is now 3.43% of shares.

Insider buying vs. selling — Switzerland constraint. Swiss-listed PGHN does not file Form-4-style trades; significant-shareholder disclosures only update when crossings happen. The founders' aggregate positions have been static-to-slightly-rising for years, and they only trade in the two annual Order Windows that follow earnings.

Related-party behaviour — this is the alignment friction. Partners Group runs an Employee Commitment Plan (ECP) under which executives and Board members invest alongside clients on fee-waived terms. The 2025 waived fees disclosed to the Board are large:

Loading...

That is CHF 15.3 million of effectively additional Board compensation that does not appear in the headline pay table — it is fee revenue the firm did not collect from the founders' co-investments. It is disclosed and shareholder-approved, and the founders' co-investments do align them with client returns; but it materially understates true Board take-home and is the single biggest related-party item in the filings.

Founder veto over investment. Per the CGR, IOC members Erni and Gantner together hold one vote in the Global Investment Committee and have the right to veto any GIC transaction. Two men can stop any investment the firm wants to make. For a private-markets manager whose only product is judgement on deals, that is a meaningful concentration of decision power 20+ years after they stepped out of CIO roles. It is also what allows them to dedicate 2–3 days a week (not full-time) and run outside ventures: Gantner chairs Breitling, PG3, Real North, Community Climate Solutions; Wietlisbach chairs Blue Earth Capital, WieRe, Power Source Holding.

Skin-in-the-game score: 9/10. Founders own ~15% after 30 years, no dilution since IPO, mandatory shareholding (CEO 6x base, ET 3x base) is enforced (6 of 10 currently compliant, the two non-compliant are 2024 joiners with 5 years to comply), realized pay tracks shareholder outcomes (cut from 14.3M to 10.0M last year), and there are no severance / golden-parachute / change-of-control accelerants. One point off only because the IOC veto + ECP fee waivers means founders extract some value that arms-length shareholders cannot.

4. Board Quality

Eight members; four executive (Meister + three founders); four independent (Angehrn, Lester, Olivier, Zhao). Lead Independent Director: Gaëlle Olivier, who also chairs RAC and OOC. On paper this is best-practice 50/50. In practice the executives chair every operationally important committee (IOC, COC) and the independents are concentrated on audit, comp and risk oversight.

No Results
Loading...

The real independence question. All four independents are credible: Olivier ran AXA's P&C globally and was Deputy GM of Société Générale; Angehrn ran FINMA and was Zurich's CIO; Lester ran JPMorgan AM Retirement Solutions for 30 years; Zhao ran BP Gas Asia and is currently a Temasek Senior Advisor. None has prior PG line management; none has line-management functions today; tenures are short (1–4 years), so capture risk is low. The weakness is not the individuals — it is that they sit on RAC/NCC/OOC while the founders own IOC and COC. The committees that decide what the firm invests in are executive-controlled; the committees that decide whether the firm is run honestly are independent-controlled. That is a defensible split for a private markets manager, but it leaves the Grizzly-style "are these marks honest?" debate to executive-controlled IOC plus the new ex-FINMA member on RAC.

Process quality is high. 2025 aggregate Board attendance 90%; five Board meetings; RAC met five times with PwC present; auditor was rotated from KPMG to PwC in May 2025 after a clean tender (KPMG was lead auditor for many years). No outstanding loans to any Board or ExTeam member. No change-of-control / golden parachute provisions. The bonus-malus / clawback right exists and has never been used. 87% shareholder approval of 2024 comp report — high but not unanimous.

Composition trend is positive. Three of four independents are women; Olivier, Angehrn, Lester and Zhao represent French, Swiss, American and Singaporean nationalities. The Board target of 50% under-represented groups in new independent appointments (3-year rolling) is being met.

Best descriptor: real independence on audit/comp, executive control on investment. Functional, not captured, but the founders' veto block keeps it from being fully arms-length on the decisions that matter most to a private-markets manager.

5. The Verdict

Grade: B. This is a well-governed private-markets manager by the standards of its peer group, with genuine founder skin-in-the-game and a pay framework that actually flexes with performance — but a few structural features keep it from an A.

Skin-in-the-game

9

Board insider ownership

16.5%

CEO realized 2025 (CHF '000)

10,014

What would move the grade.

Upgrade trigger (B → A−): the firm voluntarily caps or eliminates ECP waived fees for Board members, or a credible independent valuation review of evergreen-fund NAVs is commissioned and published in response to the short-seller report, or an independent director is added to the IOC with veto rights.

Downgrade trigger (B → C): material confirmation of any of the Grizzly NAV-markup allegations, or a related-party transaction emerges that has not been pre-disclosed under the ECP, or the founders' outside ventures (PG3, Real North) develop financial entanglements with PG portfolio companies that look like related-party deals.

For now, the answer to the question "do management and governance deserve trust?" is yes, with eyes open. The founders have earned the benefit of the doubt on integrity through 30 years of zero dilution and substantial personal ownership. They are also extracting more economic value than the headline tables suggest, and the institutional infrastructure to challenge their investment decisions does not yet exist inside the Board.